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PROHIBITION IN NEW MEXICO, 1917

JAMES A. BURRAN

THE

EDDY, New Mexico, was established in the spring
of 1889 as part of a dream empire conceived by Charles A. Eddy
and J. J. Hagerman fOf the Pecos valley of southeastern New
Mexico. The town quickly attracted settlers, largely because o~
several government projects which were under construction in:
that area. But since Charles Eddy was a strict prohibitionist, there
was a unique restriction placed upon all settlers who moved to
Eddy. This was the prohibition within the town limits of alcohol
in any form except for medicinal usage.
,
Naturally this bone-dry atmosphere irritated many of the
inhabitants, so in 1892 a group of pro-liquor men moved about
one mile south of Eddy and founded the town of Phenix. A
number of saloons, a brothel, and a few honorable businesses
constituted the town. Within a few months Phenix began to
enjoy a prosperous trade from Eddy and the surrounding government projects. But because of the fact that Phenix thrived on
violence, alcohol, vice, and gambling, it soon became an unsavory
community.
.
Finally, several events caused the death of Phenix, the most
important of which was the retirement of Charles Eddy and the
withdrawal of his personal influence. This permitted saloons and
alcohol to move back into Eddy, and by about 1897 Phenix was
a ghost town. In 1899 the name of Eddy was changed to Carlsbad
in order to help erase the memory of its founder and the events of
the 189o'S.1
TOWN OF

r
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The founding of Phenix as an answer to forced prohibition in
Eddy is fairly characteristic of the minds of New Mexicans during
the late nineteenth century and serves to explain in part the
unorthodox methods which were often used on the frontier.
Actions such as those just described were not revolutionary to
frontier people but an accepted way of doing things. Even in
1912, the year New Mexico became a state, the &ontier code was
still in existence and the people had not significantly changed
their way of thinking.
By 1915 New Mexico was represented in the Congress of the
United States as the forty-seventh state of the Union. It had
created an acceptable constitution in 1910 and 191 1, and its
government was functioning well. New Mexico in 1915 covered
an ~rea of 1 19,600 square miles and had a population somewhere
around 350,000. Within this population were 255,000 nativeborn Anglos and persons of Hispanic descent. In addition, there
were 12,000 Hispanic people of foreign birth, as well as 20,000
Indians and a handful of Negroes. The number of males eligible
to vote totaled 95,000, with 73 per cent either Anglo or Hispanic.
The illiteracy rate in the state was 20.2 per cent, most of this
group Indian. 2 Although the state was young, inexperienced, and
sparsely populated, with a diverse ethnic makeup, the strong
forces of prohibition did not hesitate to invade New Mexico as
part of their general plan for national ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment.
The Anti-Saloon League had been working in New Mexico
since 1910, when the territory held its Constitutional Convention.
Prohibitionist agitation at the convention was largely unsuccessful. Only nineteen of the one hundred convention delegates
favored a prohibition measure. The decision that prohibition was
not a proper matter for inclusion in the constitution effectively
killed any anti-liquor hopes. Nevertheless the:"' convention did
call for a vote concerning liquor by the New Mexico population, and this action ultimately resulted in the prohibition
vote of 1917.8
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Disheartened but not defeated, in 1915 the Anti-Saloon League
began another concentrated effort to establish statewide prohibition. The state was at that time under local-option liquor law,
but not many areas had gone dry. Only· one county, San Juan,·
was completely dry, and its population numbered but 8,500. The
only dry cities in the state were located in the eastern and southern
plains, which served as the stronghold for prohibition. These were
Clovis, Portales, and Artesia, whose aggregate population totaled
only 6,400. A few of the villages and smaller towns were also
dry. Thus prohibition affected a minority of the population of the
state-probably less than twenty-five per cent. 4
So in 1915 the Anti-Saloon League formulated a comprehensive program which was to affect every section of New Mexico.
Within five years this plan achieved success. It consisted essen~
dally of the following points: submission of a prohibition amend~
ment for the State Constitution, protection of dry territory from
introduction of liquor, and preparation of the state for ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.1>
As the forces of prohibition began working statewide for a
cause which seems not to have caught on as a major concern in
New Mexico, an important factor on the side of prohibition,
ultimately helped turn the tide of the battle. This factor was
New Mexico politics.
In order to understand the politics of New Mexico, it is necessary to recognize that the state "may be in the United States but
is not of the United States." Several conditions, generally as real
today as they were in the past, present special political problems.
The first is sparse population. Getting elected was not a matter of
statesmanship or intellectual oratory, but rather of getting out and
coming in contact with the largest possible number of people.
With a population as small as it was in 1917, every vote was
worth a great deal. The second was patronage. To the winning
faction in polities went the right to hand out state jobs from the
top to the most menial posts. Most of this patronage went to the
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Hispanic6 people, because without their support politicians could
not hope to be elected in New. Mexico. And this Hispanic
population was the third factor contributing to the political
problems peculiar to New Mexico,· giving "the state's politics a
distinct Latin-American flavor, without the armed revolutions."
The Hispanic citizen, unlike the Anglo, did not turn away from
politics but thrived on it, even though his eagerness was not
always matched by an understanding of democratic practices and
systems. 7
During the early twentieth century the Hispanic voters in New
Mexico were allied almost exclusively with the Republican Party.
This alliance came about after the Civil War, when the United
States was under the control of the GOP. Since New Mexico
was a territory, the national GOP leaders placed other GOP leaders in the high offices in New Mexico. Patronage of the Hispanic
population became widespread, and so long as the Hispanic population got patronized, Republicans got elected. The alliance
flourished throughout the early twentieth century.s
The national Republican progressive movement found its way
into New Mexico in the persons of several reform-minded GOP
leaders who concentrated on the political rather than the social or
intellectual aspects of national progressivism. They were especially
concerned with corruption and boss rule. In New Mexico, boss
rule often meant Old Guard Republican rule. Oddly enough,
however, they paid little attention to the political influence of
big business which was of great concern to the progressives nationally. This was largely an issue of urban America, and New
Mexico was hardly urban. 9
During the era of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard
Taft there were three major progressive leaders in New Mexico:
Miguel Otero, H. J. Hagerman, and George Curry. Each had
served as territorial governor, and each had openly fought corruption and bossism, often challenging the all-powerful Old Guard.
The resultant disunity within the Republican Party was further
widened by the arrival of Bronson Cutting on the scene.!()
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Cutting had moved to New Mexico from New York in 1910,
and in 1912 he purchased the Santa Fe New Mexican. Previously
the organ of the Old Guard, the New Mexican became the pro~
gressive mouthpiece of the state and remained so for many years.
It supported all kinds of reform, including prohibition. Even
though Cutting did not hold public office until the late twenties,
his influence as a progressive in New Mexico politics lasted from
1912 through the mid-thirties. l l
While Cutting and other progressive Republicans were advocating reform and generally causing trouble for the Old Guard,
the Anti-Saloon League and the Women's Christian Temperance
Union were working quietly but earnestly in every part of the
state. They lobbied hard in the state legislature, arousing public
interest. Late in 1916 the legislature began to hear proposals for an
amendment to the state constitution substituting statewide prohibition for the existing local-option provision. 12
By mid-January 1917 there were several proposals for prohibition in each house of the New Mexico Legislature. Melvin T.
Dunlavy, Senator from Santa Fe, introduced a bill which was a
duplicate of the Arizona prohibition law of 1914, but this proposal
got no further than the senate.I~ The McDonald and Clark bill
was then introduced but was tied up in a joint committee· for
some time.. Finally the committee substitute for the McDonald
and Clark bill was introduced and was passed by a sixteen to four
vote in the senate and a forty-two to five vote in the house on
February I, 1917. The press noted that opposition to prohibition
was strong in the early stages of debate, but faded away later
because the "wets" were unwilling to engage in open floor battle
with the "drys."14
This bill was officially known as Joint Resolution Number 17,
the Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions Numbers
Two and Three, and was filed with Secretary of State Lucero on
February 20, I 9 I 7. It was to be voted on in a general election by
the people of New Mexico, and, if passed, would become Article
XXIII of the Constitution of the State of New Mexico. 15
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The proposed amendment was divided into two sections. The
first described the purpose of the bill:
From and after October I, 1918, no person, association or corporation shall, within this state, manufacture for sale, barter or gift,
any ardent spirits, ale, beer, alcohol, wine or liquor of any kind
whatsoever containing alcohol . . .16

This description did not prohibit alcohol when intended and used
for medicinal purposes and did not prohibit wine when intended
and used for sacramental purposes.
The second section of the proposed amendment described the
consequences of violation of the first: the first violation of section
one, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or both fine
and imprisonment; a second violation, a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars and a sentence to the state penitentiary not to
exceed one year .17
On March 5, 1917, another bill was passed. This was the
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill Number 21, and in essence
set the date for the general election to decide on the prohibition
amendment. The election was to take place on November 6, 1917,
and if the bill passed, it would take effect on October 1, 1918.18
Many of the legislators and much of the populace were dissatisfied with the prohibition amendment passed by the legislature. Senator Issac Barth was especially critical of it and noted a
gaping loophole in the wording. According to Barth, it would
allow liquor to be presented to a customer free of charge as part
of a meal in any restaurant. For instance, a customer could pay
an exorbitant price for a sandwich and receive a beer free of
charge. Barth termed this the "rubber sandwich" loophole and
maintained the bill was not effective but merely changed the
method of liquor distribution. 19 Many New Mexico prohibitionists were equally dissatisfied, although Justice Clarence Roberts
of the New Mexico Supreme Court judged their fears unfounded
and stated that the wording of the bill was airtight. The prohibitionists did agree, however, that the proposal was a good deal
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better than the local-option law, and they backed it vigorously.20
The press also thought that the proposed law was better than
nothing, as can be seen in this editorial from the New.Mexican:
The New Mexican has been extremely skeptical of the possibility
of submission of a prohibition amendment. That the amendment is
shut off at the spigot and leaking at the bunghole is not at all
surprising. We regard it as no mean achievement for the dry forces
to have secured what has been handed them. 21

During February 1917, when the legislature was in the midst
of passing the proposed amendment, Governor E. C. de Baca
died. He had been elected in November of 1916 on the Republican ticket, naturally, and had just taken office when he contracted
pneumonia. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Governor W. E.
Lindsey, who proved a boon to the prohibition forces. Lindsey, a
native of Portales, was an ardent prohibitionist and had been
elected mayor of that city in 19°9 on the promise of prohibition
for its inhabitants. As a delegate to the Constitutional Convention
in 1910 he had tri~d earnestly to get prohibition included in the
original constitution. As governor, Lindsey took a very active part
in getting prohibition passed and during the campaign made a
great number of speeches in its favor. 22 Lindsey may certainly be
considered a progressive. When he took office in February 1917,
he advocated prohibition, women's suffrage, cessation of patronage and appointment by merit, and cessation of vote buying. 23
Lindsey and his wife began campaigning for prohibition immediately after he became governor, but on April 6 the United
States entered World War I and for the next several months prohibition was temporarily relegated to the background. From April
until October the people and leaders of New Mexico worked as in
every other state to promote enlistments and the purchase of war
bonds. In anticipation of the election,. however, the wets and drys
soon began to crank their campaigns up to full speed.
The wets conducted largely a whispering campaign. Except for
Albuquerque and Taos, where the fight was open, the proponents
of liquor quietly based their arguments on two main points. The
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first was that prohibition would raise taxes considerably since the
revenue from alcohol would be lost. The second was that prohibition would forbid the use of wine for sacramental purposes.
This was clearly false but proved effective enough to keep much
of the Hispanic populace on the wet side. 24
The dry campaign was loud, boisterous, and widespread. Unlike the anti-prohibitionists, they made considerable use of the
news media and propaganda to carry their cause to every adult
and child. The prohibitionists succeeded in getting many influential leaders in the state to go on the stump for them. These included Governor and Mrs. Lindsey, Secretary of State Antonio
Lucero, Chief Justice Clarence Roberts, and other members of
the state government. 25
The prohibitionists, led by the Anti~Saloon League and the
WCTU, bent their efforts toward the indoctrination of children
concerning the evils of liquor in order to make parents conscious
of the ruinous effects of their liquor habits on innocent children.
An example of this kind of propaganda is a WCTU-sponsored
children's parade through downtown Santa Fe on election day.
About one thousand children took part and marched by all four
polling places. WCTU officials termed the parade a success. 26
Another example was a WCTU contest in all Santa Fe County
schools. A prize of ten dollars was offered for the best essay on
"Why New Mexico Should Vote Out the Saloons." This contest
received considerable publicity and the winning essay was published in the New Mexican. 27
A more effective kind of propaganda which was widely pulJlicized by the leading New Mexico papers, was the econom~c
and military benefits of prohibition to the war effort. This argument was strengthened by the Food Administration's ban on the
production of grain alcohol. In a speech given on November 3,
Mrs. W. E. Lindsey said:
The president through the authority of a recent war measure
passed by the congress, has forbidden the manufacture of whiskey
and gin for the period of the war. Aside from the long list of awful
tragedies following in the wake of the liquor traffic, the economic
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waste is too great to be tolerated at this time. With so· many people
of the allied nations near to the door of starvation, .it would be
criminal ingratitude for us to continue the manufacture of whiskey.28

Both Mrs. Lindsey and the Governor became increasingly active
promoting the patriotic cause of prohibition. Their chief argument
was summed up in an editorial in the New Mexican of October
20 under the title "A Distinguished Example." It noted that the
Lindseys were convinced that the time had come to end the useless manufacture of alcohol from valuable food products. The
demands of the breweries for I 10 million bushels of grain, equal
to twelve million loaves of bread, were unthinkable and a crime
"when the outcome of this war may depend upon food."29
In the weeks before election day the New Mexican and the
Albuquerque Morning Journal were full of articles and editorials
favoring the passage of prohibition. Most of them went to great
lengths to play on patriotic emotions. In some instances it was
even implied that the wets were in sympathy with the Kaiser. 30
This was the most influential propaganda that the drys used and
doubtless swayed many people to the side of prohibition.
New Mexico is an inseparable part of the American union. Our
citizenship I has always been loyal. We have met every emerge~cy
bravely; victoriously. Hundreds of our young men have been called
to the colors. From time to time increasing numbers of our young
men will be called for their country. New Mexico must make sure
that these men go forth to battle with unimpaired vitality, and
clear heads. To make this possible we must adopt every measure
that will promote the efficiency and well being of every citizen.
The election of November 6th is going .to be a sort of barometer
by which the patriotism of New Mexico will be registered. 3 !

Although the Journal did publish a large number of articles
clearly favoring prohibition, it usually avoided outright propaganda, and simply reported the progress of the dry campaign.
Again and again the Journal warned that the wets had strong
support and that in order to pass prohibition the drys would have
to be on guard. In October it cited the prohibition vote in Iowa
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where the outcome was still uncertain, although the drys had been
certain of an easy victory.s2 Albuquerque was a hot spot in the
state campaigns. The fight between wets and drys was out in the
open, and the drys were forced to urge their supporters to work
more vigorously.ss In Santa Fe and the rest of the state (except
Taos) camp~igningwas more restrained.
The New Mexican, under the progressive leadership of Bronson Cutting, was more inclined to print propaganda, generally
linking prohibition with patriotism:
It is said that Germany does not consider us very seriously. At the
annual meeting of the American Medical Association last June,
alcohol was declared to have no medicinal value and its only use in
medicine is as a preservative. Now with the present rate of its
consumption, Prussianism probably notes the fact that we, as a
nation, use entirely too much liquor. Hence her apparent disdain
for a race which might be considered in a state of half-preservation.
If we are to win this war, we cannot do it if we stay 'pickled.'
. . . the responsibility comes home to every voter-he must use
his vote to help weld this nation into a mighty scalpel that will .
carve Liberty across the marble heart of Prussianism.34
i,;

Although the New Mexican was much more emphatic than the
Journal, both papers were equally loyal to the dry cause. No
doubt as the largest and most influential papers in the state they
had a significant impact upon many voters.
Such publicity and prohibition rallies held across the state made
the dry forces fairly confident of a victory. As it turned out their
confidence was justified.
On November 6, 1917, over 40,000 New Mexicans went to
the polls and passed prohibition by a margin of 16,000 votes. 311
Returns began coming in on the seventh and continued through
November 26, while a jubilant governor, secretary of state, chief
justice, and the prohibition forces rejoiced. Secretary of State
Lucero summed up the general feeling in an emotional victory
speech on November 7:
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The people of New Mexico, by their action at the polls yesterday,
with one blow succeeded in shattering to pieces the shackels [sic ]
which for years had been holding as slaves thousands of unfortunates
who are adicted [sic] to drink, and the families of those emancipated·
victims of King Alcohol, I know, are today on their knees thanking
the Almighty for the return of brighter days which they see are
coming to them shortly.36

All twenty-eight counties in New Mexico except Taos and Rio
Arriba voted dry. Counties with two to one majorities for prohibition included Colfax, Grant, Guadalupe, Lincoln, McKinley,
Sandoval, San Miguel, and Socorro. Other counties went dry by
larger majorities; some even passed prohibition by five to one.
These included Chaves, Curry, Quay, San Juan, Torrance,
Union, and Valencia. Otero County balloted six to one for
prohibition. 37
What happened to Taos and Rio Arriba Counties? Taos
County went wet by a 4- I 5 per cent margin, while according to
official records, Rio Arriba County went wet by a single vote. 3S
The Reverend R. E. Farley, chairman of the Anti-Saloon League
in New Mexico, explained that the loss was due to propaganda
claiming that prohibition would bring higher taxes and prevent
the use of wine for sacramental purposes. 39 This explanation may
be valid but the large Hispanic population in these counties suggests that the dry forces may have failed to exercise patronage and
buy sufficient Hispanic votes, a practice which obviously succeeded
elsewhere.
When the returns were finally completed they showed that prohibition had passed. The total number of votes cast was 40,879.
Of these 28,732, or 70.2 per cent, were in favor of prohibition
and 12, 147 or 29.8 per cent, against. 40
In analyzing this vote, it is necessary to look at county returns
for a regional pattern, and to determine whether there may have
been an ethnic struggle over prohibition. The vote for prohibition
was strongest in the eastern and southern parts of the state. These
counties, which voted dry by a three to one, or larger, majority,
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were almost entirely situated along the eastern border with Texas,
and the southern border with Mexico. This is understandable and
the dry forces expected it because this was the stronghold of prohibition, especially Clovis, Portales, and Artesia. 41
. Although they were not in the predominantly dry areas of
eastern and southern New Mexico, Torrance, Valencia, and San
Juan counties voted for prohibition by a five to one majority. This
can best be explained by lack of a significant Hispanic population.
Most of the residents were connected with ranching or with the
Navajo, Laguna, or Acoma Indian reservations. The Anglo voters
were in control of the election. The Hispanic· voice in both
counties was simply too weak to have any effect on the voting
results. 42 In the case of San Juan County, it should be noted that
before the election it had been the only completely dry county
in the state. 4S
All but two of the counties that went dry by a two to one
majority or less were located in the mountain north. Colfax
County voted dry by two to one as did Santa Fe, McKinley, Sandoval, San Miguel, and Guadalupe. Bernalillo and Mora Counties
went dry by only a one and a half to one majority.44 The wet
counties, Taos and Rio Arriba, were also in the north.
The fact that these counties voted either for prohibition bya
relatively small majority or voted wet may be explained by two
facts. First, this was the area where a majority of the voting
Hispanic population lived. The dry forces obviously attempted to
coerce them into voting for prohibition, but there were simply
too many pro-liquor Hispanic voters. Second, it was in this
mountainous area, which contained from one-third to one-half 'of
the total population of New Mexico, that the wets apparently
expended the most money and energy during the campaign. It is
significant that of the 12,147 votes cast against prohibition, over
half (7,162) came from the northern counties. 45
It appears that on a statewide basis the fight concerning prohibition was between the Anglo and Hispanic population. It is
true that propaganda and patronage turnedrriuch of the potential
power of the Hispanic vote to the dry side. But the northern
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section of the voting Hispanic population was so numerous that
the drys were not able to condition it as thoroughly as they would
have liked.
A good example of the voting pattern of the Hispanic and
Anglo populations is Bernalillo County in general and Albuquerque in particular. The county went dry by a vote of 1,883 to
1,288, a margin of only 595, or 15.6 per cent of the total vote
cast. Five of the twenty-one precincts in the county went wet, but
this is not significant since the votes cast in all five precincts
totaled only 397. These five precincts were almost exclusively
inhabited by persons of Hispanic descent. 46
Two precincts in Bernalillo County included,theCitY'of f\lbuquerque, and they were divided into four districts. 47 The two
districts on the Rio Grande, the western and older half of the
city, had a much larger Hispanic population than the two eastern
districts. 48 There is, however, an apparent contradiction. The two
predominantly Anglo districts voted dry by a sizeable majority, as
expected, but so did the second district of the twelfth precinct,
which was predominantly Hispanic. Why did it not vote in the
same way as the predominantly Hispanic second district of the
twenty-sixth precinct?49
The answer to this question is unknown but one may speculate;
The fact that the second district of the twelfth precinct contained
a larger population than the other Hispanic district may have
inspired the dry forces to greater effort because they considered it
more important than the other. Moreover, there are indications
that there was a larger Anglo population in the second district of
the twelfth precinct than. in the second district of the twenty-sixth
precinct. Anglo influence and possible patronage of their Hispanic
neighbors may have affected the vote. 50
There does indeed appear to' be an ethnic pattern of voting in
Albuquerque. The southwestern district, with its large Hispanic
concentration, voted for prohibition by only a 7.3 per cent margin.
The northwestern district also with large Hispanic aqd small· but
apparently influential Anglo populations, voted· dry. by a 29.3 per
cent margin. The northeastern and southeastern districts, which
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included the newer part of the city and thus the predominantly
Anglo region, voted for prohibition by margins of 18.3 per cent
and 37.6 per cent respectively.51
As for voting patterns throughout the state one general question remains. Why did the state turn from decidedly wet in 1915
to decidedly dry in 1917? In 1915 less than twenty-five per cent
of the population of New Mexico was completely dry.52 In the
election of November 6, 1917 over seventy per cent of the votes
supported prohibition.53 Why this complete change of attitude?
The answer is twofold. In the first place, the war produced a
demand for men and food which greatly taxed the resources of
the nation. So, with the help of prohibition propaganda the
people of New Mexico became convinced that in order to win
there must not be any hindrance of the war effort. Although
arguments of the dry forces did overemphasize this, it was true
that a ban on liquor was directly related to wartime economy.
The second reason for the switch in New Mexico was that the
state leaders who came into office in 1916 favored prohibition.
Among the more important were Governor Lindsey, Secretary of
State Lucero and Chief Justice Roberts. R. E. Farley of the AntiSaloon League correctly noted that it was they who got the dry
cause rolling in the state. Along with many others of considerable
power, they began to push for a state organization to get a prohibition amendment passed,54 and their influence was a major
factor in the election of 1917.
Mter these hectic weeks prohibition became of little concern
during 1918 when the Allies continued to batter Germany, who
was now at war against half the world. As the end of the war
drew near, the State of New Mexico and the country at large
began screaming for vengeance and unconditional surrender. The
day for prohibition to take effect in New Mexico came and went
practically unnoticed. Prohibition began at midnight on October
I, 1918. The newspapers, whose columns were filled with news
about the war, only briefly mentioned the passage of liquor from
the scene. The Journal, the New Mexican and other newspapers
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published articles in the forni of obituaries. The sarcastic editors
of the New Mexican said:
Old King Alcohol died at midnight Monday. It was thought by
a number of his friends that he would live throughout yesterday,
but his breathing grew rather slow and difficult by 6 o'clock Monday
evening, and shortly after supper it was announced in the lobbies
of the hotels that there positively was no hope to pull the patient
through the night. 56

This effusion was representative of the quiet resignation of the
saloon owners and the equally quiet jubilation of the prohibitionists. Evidently the dry forces thought the battle was over. They
wallowed in self-esteem, and apparently found no reason to make
public threats of dire consequences if the law was broken. As
events were to prove, however, the battle for effective prohibition
had just begun.
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